What I would like to say and discuss with you, and with Dimitris in particular, is:
what are the main challenges for the peoples, lato sensu (broadly speaking), in the circumstances
today, at the present stage of global capitalism.
I don't want to be academic.
I want to be political, and I keep in mind that that might be, and should be, I hope,
listened to by the Chinese people because I'll try to draw some conclusions about what
is the challenge for China, in particular for the Chinese people.
I think we ought to, from the start, distinguish two things: the crisis within capitalism,
from the crisis of capitalism.
Now, crisis within capitalism.
We had many many crises of that kind, throughout the 19th century in particular.
But the present crisis which - and I will say something about it - started in mid-seventies
of the last century, 50 years ago, and it's continuing, with ups and downs but it's continuing.
It's not an economic crisis.
It's a systemic crisis of capitalism, which means that we have reached the point where
capitalism has moved from growing positively, expanding, deepening - with many negative
aspects for many people but also some historical positive aspects - into a period of what I
dare call "senile capitalism", that is, declining capitalism.
Declining doesn't mean that it will die by itself - we have to just wait until it dies.
So I say it's a crisis of capitalism, of senile capitalism, which as I said: one, it doesn't
mean that capitalism is going to die slowly by itself and quietly; it doesn't mean also
that there are not features which appear to be brilliant, such as new technologies, such
as high growth here and there.
No.
Capitalism has been weakened by its nature - and that was I think what Marx alone understood.
Nobody else understood that, which is the most fundamental, that it is a system which
is not viable because it is based on an internal contradiction beyond class struggle, beyond
class struggle which is commonplace, by the fact that the conditions for its smooth reproduction
and expansion are in contradiction with the basic pressure on wages, the price of labor,
so that there is a tendency of capital profits to be always too high, and cannot be reinvested
for the expansion of the system.
Capitalism has been able to overcome continuously that contradiction during a century, maybe
a century and a half, let's say from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and of the 18th
century to the Second World War, by expanding internally, by absorbing 'pre-capitalist'
systems, and externally by conquering the peripheries and constructing the periphery
which could provide an answer to this contradiction.
But it has reached now -- this is my view, it is not shared by many people, but I have
not seen, nowhere at least, any convincing argument against it.
There is rhetoric against it, and precisely the rhetoric is that we have beautiful new
technologies and so on and so forth, which is not the problem.
It's the following: that in a very short period, at the beginning of this crisis of capitalism,
which started with the US dollar delinked from gold in 1971, and then in 1973 the rate
of exchange on the market, the market system, for the financial flows and monetary systems,
in a period of three, four years - no, even less, two or three years - the average rate
of growth for the Triad (US, Europe and Japan) went down to half of what it has been on the
average for the 30 years before, from after World War II to 1975, 1945 to 1975, and they
have never recovered since.
Never, never.
They remain half on the average, and the trend is to be less and less.
Well, some people say, that means capitalism is sick in the Old West - United States, Europe
and Japan - but is growing elsewhere, particularly in China, but also India, Brazil and other
countries, with high rates of growth, and therefore it's only that the center of gravity
of capitalism is perhaps moving to other places.
I think this is nonsense, because the other parts where it is apparently growing, remain
submitted, subjugated to the center.
They remain peripheries.
What has happened with this long crisis was - what was the response of capital to the
challenge?
The response was three strategies.
One, deepening the strength, reinforcing the strength, of monopoly capital.
That is, monopoly capital is not something new, it has already eighty years of age at
least.
But now monopoly capital has reached the point which I think must be qualified as a new stage.
I have called it generalized monopoly capital.
Why generalized?
We can call it "late monopoly capital", "post-monopoly capital", I don't know
what, but these are semantics.
What is the content?
It's that monopoly capital now, at that stage, has been able for the first time to control
everything.
That is, all, or almost all, the forms of production which are not directly owned and
managed by monopoly capital are submitted to the stages of quasi-subcontractors, meaning
that they are controlled – overflowed by those who provide the inputs, the credit and
so on; and downstream, upstream and downstream, by those who control the markets.
The example of agriculture is typical of that in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere.
That is one.
But that monopoly is not only a monopoly, I stress, it is a strengthened monopoly of
control, not necessarily of property.
Property is something else.
For instance the formal property juridically can be millions of people, the shareholders,
but it's meaningless.
The decision is in the hands of a handful of those who control the decision.
That is one.
Second, because of their overall control, and exclusive control I would say, previously
they were compelled by the political social balances within the various countries to make
compromise with other segments of the bourgeoisie, with the petty entrepreneurs, with the I don't
know what, including with some working class in some cases.
Now they are not, they are not.
So that is the abolition.
It gives them a total power, which means the end of the formal bourgeois democracy.
"Left" and "right" had a meaning, "left" meant conservative, "right"
meant reformist, but real reformists.
Now it's meaningless.
Socialists have become social liberals.
There is a consensus that nothing can be done against the so-called market.
What is meant by market is the control of monopoly capital over the market.
It's not the market by itself.
And the blahblah in China about the virtues of the market do not take into account the
reality: what market are we speaking of?
Third aspect of the domination, the domination over the media.
The media have become what I call a clergy in the service of monopoly capital.
They all repeat the same thing, and they all say the same, on any question, they take their
orders and they just repeat the thing that must be said.
The fourth aspect is the pseudo culture of the formation of the people to think that
they are free individuals when they are in fact depoliticized, they are no more citizens
and working people; they are consumers and spectators of the TV.
So that's maximal alienation.
The present system is close to what is a totalitarian regime, much more than what was said about
the Soviet Union for instance, or China of Mao, or, even if it were very different, very
different, Hitler and the fascists.
Totalitarianism.
But it is a soft totalitarianism, which means that it does ask, request, for the people
to support them positively, by demonstrating.
But just to accept.
Soft, but the soft, if you resist, can become hard and can become criminal against you,
criminalizing the opposition and the resistance.
This is point one, the response of capital to that New Age of monopoly capital.
I call it declining monopoly capital, because capitalism was able to manage the system by
other means, by the means of bourgeoisie democracy, by the means of historical compromises with
a variety of classes, by the means at the international level also of compromises on
something, sometimes; also compromises on the division, partition of the world: you
have an influence here, we have an influence there, you have colonies here, we have colonies
elsewhere, and accept one another.
Now they cannot.
So the second feature which is new also, in my opinion, is what I'm calling the Collective
Imperialism of the Triad, that is, the centers of historical imperialism which were first
the major countries of Europe and United States, and a little later, Japan - the Triad - plus
their external provinces, say: Australia, Canada, that have become fundamental allies.
That is, it doesn't mean there is no conflict among them on interests here and there, in
a region or somewhere, but it means they have understood that they cannot manage the world,
because they represent 15% of the world population.
They cannot manage the rest of the world which includes China and Russia and also Asia, Africa,
Latin America, the Caribbean, without being in solidarity, and they accept the leadership
of the U.S., because the U.S. is the military master.
It has, almost alone, the means of interfering and destroying, without being limited by its
internal opinion even.
There is no opinion in the U.S.
The U.S. can decide to bomb here and there.
Nobody will protest in the U.S. Oh, some people - individuals, some groups
- but not the society.
So, that is Collective.
Imperialism until the Second World War was to be conjugated in plural.
There was not Imperialism - there was British imperialism, American imperialism, French
Imperialism, German imperialism, Japanese Imperialism, also in conflict among themselves
and really giving to big wars.
Now we can speak of Imperialism, not the "Empire", but Imperialism, Collective Imperialism.
That is the second feature of the stage where we are.
That system is not viable, not viable precisely because what it offers to 85% of the world
population is miserable.
Perhaps not in the case of China because it happens to have been associated with two brilliant
successes of China - one the Maoist period, and second the post Maoist period.
The "modernization" of China went very fast, which is a very big country, not a small one.
It is not Taiwan, because the miracle of Taiwan can be explained by the strategy of the U.S.
to have it to face China, but not the miracle of China.
That is the result of the struggles and the political choices of the Chinese, the ruling
classes and the people, in their contradictions but also in their common moving up.
Therefore, facing that, there is not only the danger that we see already, that the Collective
Imperialism has understood that it cannot manage the world except by the use of more
and more violence.
This is one, in my opinion, of the symptoms of the decline of a system.
A system which is not declining does not need more and more violence.
It can be violent here and there, but does not need systematically more and more violence.
This is why a declining system is not a system which is going to die by itself.
Either you kill it, or it kills you.
And again I go back to Marx.
Marx said that the struggle, we can say the class struggle, but also the class struggle
lato sensu, which becomes the political struggle, which includes the internal struggles of classes
and also the external struggles of so-called nations in the geopolitical sense.
These struggles have reached the point where we need Revolution - even if the word is pompous
with a capital R, and I will say something about that - that is, an attempt to be lucid
that the system is senile, that its senility is very dangerous.
That senility means more and more violence, not peace and democracy, plus welfare perhaps,
or plus growing, growth of GDP, with inequalities or perhaps with reducing a little of that
inequality.
No, it means exactly the opposite: growing inequalities within the societies, between
the societies, more and more plunder, including the so-called ecological plunder.
That is, capitalism, this capitalism, is not able to deal with the questions of how to
limit not only the waste, the small waste, but the destruction of the production and
reproduction of life and perhaps even the earth.
So, we have to understand that.
This is my analysis of the present crisis of the system.
Therefore I will say two things, therefore in general, and therefore for China in particular.
Therefore, in general.
Either there is a lot of resistance to that, local resistance which are not united, which
are many; many resistances on specific problems, which are growing.
You can see it even by the social resistance in France today, to more direct rule by financial
monopoly capital in the frame of the Collective Imperialism.
You can see it everywhere.
You can see it even by the explosions, like the explosions in the Arab countries, and
you can see it by, within Europe itself, Greece, the Cyprus affair, and everywhere - but without
lucidity.
What do I mean by lucidity?
Those people who are struggling - these are mostly legitimate struggles, I'm not questioning
it.
I mean when women struggle for equality of rights, equality of salaries for instance,
it's fair, it's legitimate.
But they don't relate their problem to this systemic crisis of capitalism.
And so on for the others, for everybody.
Which means that those struggles at the present stage are fragmented, and being fragmented
they are on the defensive, which means that the initiative is left in the hands of the
ruling class, of monopoly capital, and it's a response to that.
They don't have a counter-project: Communism - a higher stage of human civilization, made
possible at the present level of development of productive forces.
But they don't have it.
Now, what is needed is precisely to move from a defensive strategy of fragmented movements
to an offensive strategy of relatively united movements, which means many things.
It means, one, internationalism, and that is fundamental.
It means, two, the capacity within each nation, to take the Maoist expression, to manage the
contradictions within the people.
Not everybody even of the people, the working people, in the short run have the same interests.
But managing that.
And for that to be lucid we need an organization, or we need organizations at all levels: from
the national level - because politics are still going to be run for a long time within
societies which are called nations, whether they are truly national, single nation - these
are other problems.
And, at the international level: that organization has a name: the International.
The International here, I would say two things about it.
One, it cannot be a remake of either the Second or the Third International, which were based
on the idea: 'one country, one party', or, what Lenin said, 'one class, one party'.
And all the other organizations are transmission belts of that one party, the good one, whether
a reformist one like the Second international was, European and reformist, Imperialist Europe
and reformist; or anti-capitalist and more global, including the Chinese, Iranian, Arab,
Latin American, African, Indian, in the International.
But one party.
No, it cannot be that.
It should be - it's more difficult.
The challenge is how to unite with respect for diversity; that is, to have many organizations,
different organizations, and not only so-called political parties, but also trade unions,
also popular associations in struggle, provided of course: one, that they understand and accept
that what unite us is more important than what divides us; second, that they keep their
independence of thinking, and that we are not going to have a trial on their ideologies
- are you Marxist or not Marxist?
Are you this or that?
They can keep their historical roots and so on, and references, but provided that they
are in struggle, and not accept to be manipulated by monopoly capital as instruments for them.
That is what we need.
We are very far from that.
Even the idea is not considered, neither within any country nor at the international level,
at the global level.
They believe - and you have examples of that - they believe that each one should be completely
independent and conduct his struggles, and that they are often even in disagreement,
deep disagreement, with the people who are also struggling etc, for one or another reason.
Questions of short run interest, or questions of ideologies, of pseudo ideologies, of historical
reference, or anything else.
This is why at best, if we have that, this is a degree of what I'm calling just "lucidity".
Try to have more lucidity in the understanding of what is the real enemy, and what are and
should be allies, and what is the target, expressing immediate or short-run strategic
'advances'.
This is what I am calling, rather than Revolution.
We have been used to calling it Revolution, not since the Marxist and the communist movement
but even before - the French Revolution.
I would prefer to understand it as 'revolutionary advances', which means that they prepare possible,
but only possible, later other revolutionary advances.
And they compel the enemy to be on the defensive, and to withdraw, and to become therefore a
little less aggressive.
Because they are forced to be so.
That is the best thing.
The other way of change, historical change, is through decadence, which means that there
will be no lucidity.
The movements would remain fragmented.
The ideological and cultural references could be anything, including love of the past, idealizing
their past as finding the solution, the response to the present problem, and the future in
the past, but not looking into the future.
It can take pseudo religious form, not only among the Muslims but you find it among the
Christians, you find it among the Buddhists, you find it everywhere, among the Hinduists
etc., all pseudo racial, like ethnicity.
The case, the bad, good case, is the case of Yugoslavia.
What does it mean being a Serb or a Croat, is fundamentally different, etc.
Or in Africa, so-called 'tribal' - I don't use the word 'tribal' but "so-called",
because some of those 'tribes' are 40 or 50 million people, they are more in number
than the Dutch people or the people of Iceland, which are called 'nations'.
But anyway, in that case history continues but by itself, I mean the human beings are
not active actors knowing where they want to go.
They have completely abandoned lucidity about what has happened in history.
The most known case is the decadence of the Roman Empire.
Some people speak of a bourgeois revolution for capitalism to appear, some people speak
of socialist revolution, for beyond capitalism moving toward socialism, but nobody speaks
of a feudal revolution in the Roman Empire.
Feudalism was the product of history, without anyone having a project of replacing the old
Roman Empire by Feudalism, in Western Europe at least.
So we have cases of that.
Those cases - and the comparison in my opinion is very important and dramatic - if we look
at the case of the Western Roman Empire, it took 600 years, perhaps 1,000 years, of the
decline of the societies, with invasions, in demographic
terms even, the population of the Roman Empire declined for five or six centuries, the Western
one.
The Eastern one, which we belong, Dimitrios and I, had another decline, a little more
mastered by the ruling class locally, and therefore it took longer, with its more, I
would say, negative aspects and positive finally.
People should be aware of that.
Now, I come to what I derive from this analysis for China.
I don't classify China today too quickly: is it capitalist? is it socialist?
It is neither socialist nor capitalist.
It is still a society of the periphery in struggle, started on the long road to socialism
and making compromises with global capitalism, which reflects that there are two forces which
are struggling for moving the country towards really being absorbed in capitalism, or moving
ahead on the long road to socialism.
I will say two or three words on the so-called Chinese characteristics and where is China
today.
Chinese characteristics - I'm not shocked by that, because the long road from out of
capitalism, I'm saying the problem, the challenge, is not to try to support moving out of the
crisis of capitalism, within capitalism, but moving out of capitalism in crisis, in crisis
of decline, which is something very different, and different perspectives
and strategies.
China is or should be put in that framework.
Now, what are the major, two major illusions that I feel are present in China?
One is the illusion of easy success, that things can continue to be as they have been
for 70 years, and not only the 40 last years of post-Maoism, but also the 30 years of Maoism,
successful: 'We have a long history, we are a big people, a big nation, we have been in
the past at a very glorious position in the world, and we are going back to have this
position, and easily, easily.
And there are some problems, internal and external, some enemies, but they are not dangerous
or important, so we can deal with all that by a good quality politics and nothing more.'
This is a very, very, very big and dangerous illusion, and I think that this illusion is
not only particular to probably a good part of the ruling class, but a wide, large part
of the middle class, which has more than the others benefited from the success, from a
very small middle class 70 years ago to 300 million people today, which is not a small
thing.
So that is very, very dangerous.
The second one is: in the present conjuncture, China has chosen a global strategy of, instead
of trying to participate in that globalization, but trying to control its participating in
that globalization, and therefore take the benefits of it and minimize the negative aspects
of it.
We hear very often in China this type of language: we can take advantage of that and be careful
- there are some dangers but we are aware of them and we can keep them out.
China has this participation in globalization, particularly trade globalization, and with
an aggressive export policy even.
And that is one, in capital globalization, capital, not finance.
A capital globalization in the sense of accepting foreign investment in China or inviting them
even, and also starting investing outside.
For the foreign investment in China, a certain degree of control of the State over it, that
it is not as open - I mean no country could be more open to foreign investment than the
African countries.
They have no rules to stop anything.
And the foreign investments are not done in Africa.
They are going to China where they are controlled, a curious control which is a mixture of the
state apparatus operating over some degree of control, of associating private new bourgeoisie,
Chinese new bourgeoisie, of a variety of forms.
That is a negotiated participation, participating in global investment, global capital, capital
globalization.
But China has kept until now, I am saying 'until now', out of the financial globalization.
That is, it has remained, and it is almost the only country now, in which all the banks
or 95% of the activities of the banks are state controlled, not only Chinese controlled
but state controlled.
And the Yuan is run by the Central Bank of China; that means by the Chinese government,
not by the market.
The maximum pressure is done on China on that ground specifically: you should move towards
participating in financial globalization.
And I'm saying, and I would like to repeat it and to have it understood by the Chinese
including at the highest level, top level, that moving into financial globalization would
be a final disaster.
It would destroy China.
It would destroy all that you have been able to successfully conquer during 70 years, everything.
I give an example of that.
Thanks to not participating in the global, financial globalization, the GDP of China
- whatever is the meaning of that, I don't want to go into details, I have some doubts
about the way it is calculated, the meaning of the calculation and so on - but anyway,
in purchasing power it's being said it is 18% of global GDP in current Yuan, or in US
Dollar, because there is a fixed Chinese decided fixed rate, it is 16 percent.
The difference is very small.
If you compare to India which is participating in the global financial system, in purchasing
power it's half of China, 8 percent of global GDP, but in US Dollar, it is 2 percent, and
less than 2 percent, which is a gigantic difference, which means a destruction, a capacity of foreign
capital to plunder in a variety of forms.
That is a very important point.
If you add to that, that the success of China has been based since Mao, and since Mao even
before the victory of 1949, from the Civil War, from the war in the South to the Long
March and so on, has been to integrate and associate the majority of the peasants in
the struggle for rebuilding China, in rebuilding the society.
I'm not saying building socialism.
Things understood by them, and that has been kept until now, with ups and downs, with errors
but which were corrected, but ups and downs have been kept, by maintaining State formal
property, managed by the local communities, and with a target of, as far as possible,
equal rights, equal access to land.
It's not a beautiful 'equal' but tending to that.
That is fundamental.
If land is changed into becoming a commodity like in normal capitalism, in the history
of capitalism, it will be the end of the Chinese peasantry, it will be destroyed.
Take an example, China and Brazil, or China and India and Brazil.
China has been able, with 6% of the world arable land, to feed 20% of the world population.
The ratio of arable land to population in Brazil is not twice better than China; it's
17 times better than China, 17 times.
I have calculated it, Brazilians have calculated it.
17 times better.
China is a country where you don't see extreme poverty.
You see it somewhere in places.
It does exist.
But you don't see it massively.
It's a poor country where you don't see poverty, to say it short.
Brazil is a rich country where you see exclusively poverty.
That is, two-thirds, two-thirds of the population live in favelas, two-thirds of the population.
That's a gigantic difference and you should be aware therefore that abandoning the land
policy, there is pressure on that from internal forces of course.
Some potential rich peasants associated to agro-business, foreign and local, associated
to a new Chinese bourgeoisie, including the State bourgeoisie, would like to have land,
access to land, and external forces which are present in that - that would be the destruction
of China also.
I think those two points, I stress on those two points - there are a lot of points but
if the Chinese including the leadership understand that the dream of becoming a top power, because
of population it would become the first country in the world, not only in population but in
production of anything - is a very naive dream.
Therefore those who have those dreams will favor, will make easier, or will be surprised
by the aggressiveness of the enemy.
That is, taking advantage of the weakness of China at some point, they will simply go
to war, including nuclear war.
I always repeat that: in an internal document of Pentagon which was approved and signed
by Clinton, who is considered a little better than some other presidents before and after,
accepted the idea at that time of having six hundred million Chinese exterminated, exterminated
by nuclear war.
And he signed this possibility, if China became dangerous.
What means dangerous?
China is not going to destroy the United States by nuclear war, it has not that strategy in
mind.
Becoming dangerous means becoming a prosperous country, capitalist country, and they don't
accept that.
I'll give an example: when there was a historical social compromise in Russia, in Soviet Union,
between communist forces and the peasant bourgeoisie, the New Economic Policy (NEP), Soviet Union
accepted for a time a kind of local capitalism along the socialist power, but that did not
stop the West from the cold war against Russia, against Soviet Union.
They did not recognize, they did not accept the NEP.
They saw that it was a stage possible but which, finally, will be useful for socialists
to move ahead, later, but to move ahead.
And therefore they fought it, as well as they fought collectivization, as well as they fought
Soviet Union after the Second World War.
So be careful of that.
Have it in mind.
You must have it in mind.
I give another example which is today.
It happens that the easiest menace of the United States against China, is against North
Korea and Iran: one probably, certainly, has nuclear power, small but still, Korea; the
second, possibly, which could become a nuclear power easily, Iran.
To focus on them, and to say they have to be destroyed, destroyed.
That is a direct menace.
The support of the United States to a semi-fascist kind of militarization of Japan is typical.
And the attempt to use the disastrous problem of the South Sea of China, to divide, separate
China from friendship with Vietnam, from solidarity against imperialism, is typical of that.
So you ought to be very aware of the menaces, the real menace of destruction of China.
It's not a continuous prosperity.
Therefore the need for China to play a role in supporting - they cannot, Chinese people
cannot replace the Egyptians and the Greeks, the Greeks and the Egyptians are responsible
for themselves - but try to have a strategy, a policy, which support the idea and the moving
towards an International is fundamental.
A good joke: a citizen of the U.S., very ordinary person who has never traveled outside of the
U.S. goes for the first time to Britain.
And he says, he phones back to his family in the U.S., he says 'I'm in a strange country.
Everybody speaks American here but with a different accent.'
And he was answered by an Englishman to whom he has said that, 'Don't you think it's the
opposite?', and he did not understand what it meant...
For instance I had a positive echo in Spain because I attended the meeting where fortunately
there were people of Podemos, Izquierda Unida, the trade unions, the Obreros, the Communist
Party and the left intellectuals who are well known.
And they all surprised me, they are quite positive: yes we need that.
In Egypt there was enthusiasm.
Mamdouh is typical of that, enthusiasm even, and in a number of African countries, particularly
Tanzania, Ethiopia, Senegal, South Africa, there were sympathetic responses.
There seem to be sympathetic response from people in Brazil now.
But Chavez had taken an initiative which I think was childish, was to say we need to
just proclaim it, and the first party which will be remembered of this International is
my Venezuelan Bolivarian party.
I said to Chavez himself directly: I think the process is much more difficult than just
saying we have created the International.
Lenin could do it in 1917 because there has been the October Revolution, victorious.
The project is not moving.
My personal idea is that there should be perhaps, perhaps - I'm not saying more than that - the
good way to have it is to have National Committees in favor of that, significant committees with
a number of people who are representative, say, trying to build it, first in their home
country, precisely because it is at that point that you have the maximum animosities.
Anyway the project doesn't move, doesn't move.
For instance we had a project which was - and Mamdouh was very sad about that because he
was really enthusiastic - the project of a meeting in Mexico which we wrote together
to at least quite a number of Latin American organizations and the project doesn't move.
You don't know what are the reasons.
I said maybe there are practical reasons, financial and others of that kind, but maybe
it's more serious than that.
It's more a political demise of the project by important forces.
I have not seen arguments, and less to say, serious arguments against it.
The Chinese Communist Party and possibly other organizations in China
could support the idea.
They cannot play the role of the old Bolshevik Party vis-à-vis the others, the big brother
and the small brothers.
It would not be advisable but they know they cannot play that role also, fortunately.
So that's not the point.
But they should not be unaware of the importance.
Let me say, I give another example, because it's a personal one, you know it because it's
in my memoirs of revolution that was supporting, that was in the Maoist period, 1963.
And it was in connection, strong connection with Zhou Enlai.
It was at that level.
A comrade whose name was 'Wang Hui' but I don't know whether it was his real name or
not - he died unfortunately, he was an old man already at that time.
They supported it, and they gave a financial support.
That is, China's government was buying, I don't know, 20,000 copies which was covering
all the costs, and which were distributed through the embassies everywhere.
So if they were to support they have means.
You know where I am very, perhaps, optimistic is: if at some top level Chinese and Russians
are convinced by our arguments about the dangers for them, as countries,
maybe they would be very helpful.
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