- Good morning.
The subcommittee will come to order.
I welcome you today to this hearing of the
House Armed Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee
on Amphibious Warfare Readiness and Training.
Today the subcommittee will hear from
the Navy and Marine Corps regarding the status
of amphibious training and readiness,
specifically the challenges of amphibious ship availability
in Navy and Marine Corps interoperability.
We're also pleased to have
the Government Accountability Office present
to comment on their recent study
of the amphibious operations training
released in September 2017.
I ask the witnesses to do their best
to describe where shortfalls exist
and what can be done to improve
the less-than-optimal state we're in,
specifically how better
and more consistent funding can help.
We have held a number of readiness hearings and briefings
on aviation, surface combatants,
DOD infrastructure, and other topics.
Every session points to the same grim conclusion;
our services are indeed in a readiness crisis.
Marine expeditionary units aboard US Navy amphibious vessels
are an important element of our
forward deployed strategic deterrent.
To be effective, the Navy-Marine Corps team
must train together regularly,
certainly more than they do today.
Because we have too few ships,
necessary training is not possible.
President Ronald Reagan frequently used
to phrase correctly, peace or strength.
I agree with President Reagan
and believe we have a higher level of defense funding
must be achieved to achieve that goal.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today
on how this capability can be improved.
Before I introduce the witnesses,
I'm grateful to recognize Ranking Member Madeleine Bordallo,
the distinguished delegate from Guam,
for opening comments she would like to make.
- Thank you very much Mr. Chairman
and thank you to all of our witnesses for being here today.
I do look forward to discussing the challenges
that are impeding amphibious training
and the mitigations and long-term solutions
to build and sustain readiness
in the Marine Corps and the Navy.
Amphibious operations are complex
and they're difficult to say the least.
There is a tremendous amount of planning
and preparations required to ensure
the ships, Sailors and Marines, and equipment
are properly coordinated to ensure
the success of a training event
or in the event of a contingency operation,
an actual amphibious landing.
The GAO report clearly indicates
there is currently a lack of overall strategy
to allocating limited resources
that are needed for amphibious training.
The current operations tempo
as well as the limited number of ships
compound this challenge.
It is clear that better coordination
is required by the Navy and the Marine Corps
to ensure this critical war fighting and skill
is restored to a readiness level
and is required to meet our operational planning needs.
I am encouraged to see that both the Navy and the Marines
have concurred with all three recommendations made by GAO.
And I intend to monitor the progress
as both services work to restore
this amphibious operation readiness.
This committee is keenly aware
of the continuing impacts of sequestration
and unpredictable funding on readiness
in every aspect of the services.
I encourage the witnesses to share specific examples
of how unpredictable funding has impacted their ability
to conduct amphibious operations training.
And I look forward to the training
and thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
- Thank you, Ranking Member Bordallo.
In connection with today's hearing,
we welcome members of the full committee
who are not members of the Readiness Subcommittee
who are or will be willing to attend.
I ask your unanimous consent that these committee members
be permitted to participate in this briefing,
with the understanding that all sitting subcommittee members
will be recognized for questions
prior to those assigned to the subcommittee.
Without objection, so ordered.
I'm pleased to recognize our witnesses today.
I want to thank them for taking the time to be with us
and their service to our nation.
We have Lieutenant General Brian Beaudreault,
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies,
and Operations, US Marine Corps,
Vice Admiral Andrew L. Woody Lewis,
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Operations, Plans, and Strategy, US Navy,
and we have Mr. Cary Russell,
Director of Defense Capabilities and Management
of the US Government Accountability Office.
We will now ask each panel member to make brief
opening remarks before we proceed to member questions
under the very strict five minute rule of Mr. Warren.
Begin with General Beaudreault.
- Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
good morning and thank you for the opportunity
to testify before this subcommittee.
Today, Marines and Sailors are at sea
operating as amphibious ready groups,
Marine expeditionary units.
We have the America ARG in the 15th MEU
out in the Central Command region,
with some of its personnel about to embark on allied ships.
We have the Bonhomme Richard
and the 31st MEU out in the Pacific.
The Iwo Jima ARG is off the east coast of the United States
with the 26th MEU embarked, preparing to deploy.
And we have Black Sea Rotational Marines aboard DDGs,
getting ready to exercise in the European theater.
So your expeditionary forces
and readiness are postured forward
and are accomplishing our national security objectives.
The Marine Corps' review of the GAO report
on Navy and Marine Corps training
and we agree with the study,
its finding and its recommendations.
Today's testimony provides the Navy and Marine Corps
the opportunity to inform the Readiness Subcommittee
on the challenges associated with
amphibious operations training, discuss our shortfalls,
and describe our projected way ahead.
The current inventory of 32 amphibious warships
is short of our need to satisfy operational requirements,
which does negatively impact
the Naval force's ability to generate readiness
and negatively effects availability
for training with larger-scale formations.
The amphibious force structure is projected to grow
to a total of 34 ships, starting in fiscal year '21.
And the Marine Corps supports the 38 ship requirement
and the requisite funding to develop readiness
while concurrently fulfilling validated joint requirements,
accomplishing necessary fleet maintenance,
and maintaining capacity to respond
to potential contingencies.
And as the amphibious ship inventory
builds toward 38 ships in fiscal year '33,
the Navy and Marine Corps team will continue to explore
innovative ways to employ alternative platforms.
So on behalf of our Marines and Sailors,
civilians, and their families,
we thank the Congress and this committee
for the opportunity to discuss the key challenges
your Navy and Marine Corps face
and we thank you for your support.
The most important actions that Congress can take now
is to immediately repeal the caps
on defense spending and the Budget Control Act
and provide a defense appropriation
that ensures sufficient, consistent, and predictable funding
to train men and equip your Navy and Marine Corps.
And with your help, we'll overcome these constraints
and enable your Navy and Marine Corps team
to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a written statement
for the record and I'd ask that to be accepted
and I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you.
- General, thank you very much
and the persons who are here on the subcommittee
certainly endorse your statement in regard to
the Budget Control Act sequestration.
I'd like to now proceed to Admiral Lewis.
- Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today
alongside General Beaudreault.
The team before you in inextricably linked.
In our past, I have commanded Marines
and he has commanded Sailors.
We train together, deploy together, and fight together.
Our bond has been strengthened
over the centuries of our great services
and today we look forward to testifying
how we will continue that bond in the future.
I request my written statement be submitted for the record
and I will keep these remarks brief.
Right now, your Navy and Marine Corps team
is forward deployed and standing their watch.
Sailors and Marines are at sea aboard
the America Amphibious Readiness Group with the 15th MEU.
In Central Command, USS Bonhomme Richard
Amphibious Readiness Group with the 31st MEU in the Pacific.
And Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group with the 26th MEU
in the Atlantic preparing to deploy.
We are at the tip of the spear
and working everyday to sharpen it.
We reviewed the GAO report on Navy-Marine Corps
amphibious operations and training and agree with the study,
its findings, and its recommendations.
We appreciate the opportunity to inform
the Readiness Subcommittee of the challenges
associated with Navy-Marine Corps
amphibious operations training and integration,
discuss our shortfalls, and lay out a projected way ahead.
The GAO report finds the Navy's shortage of amphibious ships
to be detrimental to our ability to train.
The 32 amphibious ships currently in the fleet are stressed
to meet both combatant commander operational requirements,
ongoing contingency operations, and disaster relief,
which impacts the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps
to improve readiness and train as an integrated force.
Continuing resolutions and caps imposed by
the Budget Control Act have impacted our ability
to plan and implement training,
ship maintenance, and modernization.
While we have prioritized maintenance and readiness dollars,
the positive effects of prioritized funding
will not remove these deficits in the near term.
Restoring the readiness of the fleet requires
predictable, stable, and adequate funding over several years
to ensure that we can conduct
the required maintenance on our ships.
This stability would help the Navy to restore stocks
of necessary parts, get more ships to sea on time,
and better prepare Sailors and Marines for deployment.
Although a continuing resolution
may be better than no funding at all,
the cost associated with not being able
to start new work cannot be overstated.
Delays in shipyard maintenance periods
cause ships to either have their
training pipelines compressed or maintenance deferred.
Deferred maintenance creates an increase in costs,
due to a corresponding increase in machinery to repair.
At the same time, the value of skilled artisans
is amplified when work is stopped,
due to a lack of a labor force possessing
the qualifications to complete the repairs.
Work stoppages created by a continuing resolution
force artisans to seek alternate, more stable employment.
Skilled shipyard workers require two to four years
of training to reach journeyman certification
and five to 10 years to reach master.
Shipyards and skill workers require stable,
predictable funding to maintain their skill workforce
and invest in these critical training programs
in order to maintain and grow the shipyard capacity we need.
Maintaining the fleet is not enough to ensure readiness
when adversary capabilities continue to improve.
We need a more lethal and effective force,
which can only be realized through
modernization and new technologies.
The same stable, predictable, and adequate
funding required for maintenance
is critical to the new programs
and additional capacity we need to get better.
We are working together to overcome these challenges
at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
through the Naval Board, the services incorporated processes
to posture for increased training and integration.
Commander of the United States Fleet Forces Command
and Commander of the United States Marine Forces Command
established a co-led maritime working group
to provide an enduring interservice collaborative process
that integrates capabilities, force development,
experimentation, and emerging requirements
with exercise planning, scheduling, and resourcing.
Commander US Pacific Fleet
and Commander US Marine Forces Pacific
have similarly developed a Pacific naval integration
working group to represent the Pacific issues.
These four commands meet together quarterly
to include a meeting at this time in Hawaii.
On behalf of all Marines, Sailors,
civilians, and their families,
we thank the Congress and this committee for your support
and this opportunity to discuss
the key challenges your Navy and Marine Corps face.
The President's fiscal year 2018 request
and the recently passed National Defense Authorization Act
look toward fleet wholeness and funding
to man, train and equip, and organize
the Navy and Marine Corps.
These funds will only work if they are approved
in a consistent, predictable, and timely manner.
With your help, we will overcome these constraints
and reshape your Navy and Marine Corps
to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
I look forward to your questions.
- Thank you very much, Admiral.
We now proceed to Mr. Cary Russell.
- Good morning.
Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo,
members of the subcommittee,
thank you for having me here today
to talk about GAO's recent review of Navy and Marine Corps
training for amphibious operations.
The Navy and Marine Corps together
maintain forces capable of conducting amphibious operations,
that is military operations launched from the sea
using naval vessels to protect
the Marine Corps landing force ashore.
As you know, the United States today faces
a complex national security environment,
with threats ranging from large-scale traditional
state actors to destabilizing non-state actors.
Accordingly, the Navy and Marine Corps
must have fully trained and ready forces
to address these threats in the maritime domain.
However, each of the military services today
are generally smaller and less combat ready
than they have been in many years.
For example, over the past few decades
the number of Navy amphibious ships has decreased by 50%,
from 62 ships in 1990 to the 32 that we have today.
For my statement, I'm going to focus on three areas
that we examined in our latest report.
First, the Navy and Marine Corps' ability
to complete training for amphibious operations
and factors that limited that training.
Second, steps taken by the Navy and Marine Corps
to mitigate training shortfalls.
And third, efforts to improve overall integration
between the Navy and Marine Corps
for amphibious operations training,
referred to as naval integration.
With respect to the first area
on completing amphibious training,
we found that the Navy's fleets of amphibious ships
and associated Marine Corps combat units
that were just about to deploy
as part of those Marine expeditionary units,
had generally completed the needed training
for amphibious operations.
However, for that majority of forces
not nearing a deployment,
such as those conducting home station training
to build and maintain core competencies,
they fell considerably short of being able
to complete amphibious training requirements.
This was especially noticeable in
Marine Corps infantry battalions
and V-22 Osprey tiltrotor squadrons.
These deficits can create a potential gap
in the Marine Corps' ready bench of units.
If called on, these units could be left
scrambling to obtain last-minute training,
risking their ability to be fully ready
once deployed and underway.
The most prevalent factor we found
that hampered training completion
was a lack of available amphibious ships on which to train.
For example, data we collected or obtained
from the First Marine Expeditionary Force,
which operates out of the Pacific,
showed that the Navy was unable to fulfill 93%
of its request for Navy ship support
for training in fiscal year 2016.
Other significant factors we identified
across the Marine Corps that hampered training
included limited access to range space
and maintenance delays for amphibious ships.
With respect to actions taken by
the Navy and Marine Corps to mitigate training challenges,
we identified some important steps
that the services have taken.
For example, the Navy in working with the Marine Corps,
has assessed its needs for amphibious ships
to support current deployments
while also providing for adequate training
and now plans to increase the number of ships
in the amphibious fleet from 31 to 38.
Also, the Marine Corps is currently evaluating
its amphibious training requirements
and the number of forces that must be
trained and ready at any given time.
However, despite these actions,
we found that the service's current approach
for amphibious operations training
does not fully incorporate strategic training
and leading risk-manager practices,
such as prioritizing all available training resources.
For example, the Marine Corps relies more on
an ad hoc process to identify units
that are available or home station training
when an amphibious ship becomes available,
rather than a process that would liberally align
the next highest priority units
with those ships and other resources.
Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps have not
systematically evaluated a full range of alternatives
to achieve training priorities in light of
the limited availability of amphibious ships.
Further, while the Marine Corps has endeavored
to incorporate simulators and other virtual devices
into its training activities,
we identified gaps in its processes
to effectively develop and use them.
Namely, weaknesses on the front end planning
and post fielding evaluation of device effectiveness.
And finally, with respect to naval integration
for training activities,
the Navy and Marine Corps have taken steps
to improve coordination between the two services,
but have not fully incorporated leading
collaboration practices that would help drive these efforts.
For example, the Navy and Marine Corps
lack defined common outcomes that would help them
create a more integrated approach to managing
and executing their training programs.
This completes my statement and I would be pleased
to respond to any questions you may have.
- And thank you very much, Mr. Russell
and I thank all of you for your succinctness.
And we're gonna begin now
on the very concise five minute rule.
Even before we begin, I yesterday,
I was really pleased that you,
and Admiral, you brought it up again,
the consequence of continuing resolution
that we have and we're facing that now.
And something that would be very helpful,
as I mentioned, and I hope that both of you
could provide succinct examples
of what the additional costs are
due to a continuing resolution.
In real-world language, very brief,
so that Congresswoman Bordallo can receive that,
we would provide it to the rest of the subcommittee members,
so that we could actually use that
to explain to our constituents
what the consequence of a continuing resolution is.
And it would just be very helpful,
because it just doesn't come across as it should.
So, and we want to make it where our constituents understand
and also even our colleagues.
It would be good for them to understand too.
Admiral Lewis, you clearly articulated
in your written statement and in your opening remarks
why it is so important to grow the number of
amphibious ships currently in the Navy's inventory.
Can you please comment on why you would need
additional ships, particularly being challenged,
when the Navy has plans to take commissioned LSDs
offline for up to four years at a time.
Currently, LSD 46, the USS Tortuga,
does not have planned availability FY 16-19.
Can you please explain this further?
- Yes, sir.
In regards to taking the ships offline for maintenance,
so these ships are old and they are ships that,
you know, so it's akin to keeping a car
that you've had for a long time,
that the maintenance costs become further and further.
And we have over time, we have deferred these maintenance
because of continuing resolutions.
As an example of that deferred maintenance,
the USS Gunston Hal went into maintenance deferred.
An entire three year deferral increased the cost
from $44 million to $111 million.
And the time in maintenance went from 270 days to 696 days.
If you compare that to the cost of your personal vehicle,
that's a couple months pay of all of us,
regardless of what kind of car it is.
So that's a big impact to those funds,
those operating funds, that's how we fund those maintenance.
In the case of ships that we have taken offline,
as you state, we have really no other choice to do that,
because we don't have adequate funding
under continuing resolutions to do that maintenance,
you know, right in quick order.
If we had more funding, we could,
you know, tighten those timelines
on that maintenance on those older ships.
However, we have done the best that we can do
with the funding that we have
and spread that maintenance out over time.
- Well I want to thank you for raising,
it's not just costs, but delay, an extension of time.
And so if y'all can include that,
not just cost, but the consequence of offline and delay.
And General Beaudreault, what specific elements
of the Marine Corps atrophy and suffer the most
from the lack of amphibious ships
and training opportunities?
- Mr. Chairman, it's our ability to train at higher echelons
above the Marine expeditionary unit
and amphibious ready group unit.
Our forcible entry capability,
core competency of the Marine Corps and Navy team here,
is at risk above the MEU level.
Simply, we can do some training
through the command elements, through virtual systems,
but at some point you have to put the ships to sea
and go through a mission rehearsal.
And the ability to generate the number of ships required
to train at a Marine expeditionary brigade level
just simply isn't there.
So we take it in bite-sized chunks.
We try to train elements of the MEB the best we can,
but it's very, very difficult, lacking the capacity
to put the entire MAGTF and Navy team together at sea.
That's the greatest challenge we have,
quite honestly, right now.
- Well, and I appreciate you pointing out
that virtual can be very helpful,
but it's the actual practicality of the operation itself.
At this time, we proceed to Congresswoman Bordallo.
- Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Russell, you identified concerns
with the way the Navy and the Marine Corps
were utilizing available training resources
to conduct amphibious training.
Can you please provide us with some specific examples
where GAO felt the current process
did not effectively prioritize training?
- Yes, ma'am.
Well, let me start out by saying
with respect to the units that were
just about to deploy for the Marine expeditionary units,
they were able to train
and they were able to use those resources.
The issues we had were with that ready bench,
that group that was not ready to deploy.
And what we found is that more often
the assignment of Navy ships to Marine Corps units
was done more ad hoc,
based on the availability of the units,
for the Marine Corps units to match up to the ship
based on the availability of the ship,
rather than having a system of prioritization
and look at those Marine Corps units
that were most likely to need training earlier.
So for example, some of those units that might be tagged
to go as part of the special Marine task forces,
SPMAGTF for example,
or other things that might have a priority over others,
that distinction was not made in the process,
rather it was more of a matching of availability.
- Thank you, thank you very much.
Vice Admiral Lewis and Lieutenant General Beaudreault,
given the concerns identified by GAO,
I am concerned that additional funding
targeted toward readiness may not be prioritized
toward the units that have the highest needs.
In light of the GAO report,
can you describe what controls have been put in place
or that you plan to put in place in the coming year
that will ensure readiness resources are properly allocated
to the units with the most pressing needs?
You General, first.
- Thank you, ma'am.
I would say that, yes we do have a plan
and there are controls in place
and it gets to what Mr. Russell just referred to.
And we first ensure that we can meet
our steady state requirement,
those next to deploy have to be trained and certified
to go forward and execute their missions.
26th MUE, for instance right now,
is the priority effort to make sure
they got everything they need
before they depart the east coast of the United States
to go forward into the Central Command region.
Secondly, it's the ability to ensure
of our O plan readiness.
And that calls for units of course, in number and in size,
greater than Marine expeditionary units
or amphibious ready groups.
So we do take a look at our O plan requirements
and try to focus those units,
'cause the units change all the time
as units deploy on their normal schedule,
battalions change and squadrons change,
so we try to keep pace with the units that are
back at home station that may be next to deploy.
And that next to deploy focus is on those specifically
that may have to meet an O plan requirement.
Thirdly, it would be exercises.
And with exercises comes experimentation.
We can't afford to have sets of ships that are gonna
exercise and then we need another set to experiment.
We have integrated experimentation in with the exercises
and I think Dawn Blitz is our most recent example
that we wanted to test our ability to shoot
high mobility artillery rocket system
off of an amphibious platform, which proved itself.
So I would say that's the sequence, that's the plan,
it's to make sure that those that are next to deploy,
meeting O plan requirements,
and then exercises and experimentation in that order.
- Thank you, thank you General.
Admiral?
- Yes, ma'am.
Really to mirror what General Beaudreault said,
the first priority for funding,
additional funding that we need,
would go toward ship maintenance, so as to be able to
not have to defer any further maintenance
and to keep the maintenance time and cost
and to get done on time,
so they can get out and start the training cycle.
The training cycle is about a year long.
Six months in which we do the basic unit level training
with the Navy with Marines embarked
with their basic core competencies.
And then the second six months is fully integrated
toward the higher end training.
The prioritization really starts with that maintenance
to make sure we start on time
and then we can have the units
that we have in the inventory, which is not enough,
but we can have the units we have
in the inventory to train with.
And then the third priority would be at the higher end,
the exercises, the larger formation exercises,
where the experimentation takes place as well.
- So maintenance, training, and exercises?
- [Lewis] Yes, ma'am.
- Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
- Thank you, Ranking Member.
We now proceed to Congressman Austin Scott of Georgia.
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Admiral, it's not lost on me
that between the two of you,
you have 66 years in service to the country.
I think if Mattis and Kelly combined,
probably have over 80 years of service to the country.
And as I listen to any of the four of you that have talked,
it's pretty clear that the sequester
and the caps have done more damage,
Mattis has been very direct about it,
than any outside enemy to our military and our capabilities.
And I want to reiterate the point that I made yesterday
and I want to say this as respectfully
as I know how to do it.
As long as you ask for a continuing resolution,
you're going to get a continuing resolution.
We can put an end to this madness by the end of this year,
but only if men like you
and General Kelly and General Mattis
hold Congress' feet to the fire.
Give us Christmas Eve,
give us Christmas Day to go home to our families.
There are a lot of men and women deployed around the world.
Make us stop this madness.
But if General Mattis comes out
and says we need a continuing resolution,
I promise you you're gonna get a continuing resolution.
That's, and from the members of the HASC,
I don't intend to speak for all of them,
but I will tell you that I think among
the Democrats and the Republicans on HASC,
we all want to help you solve this problem.
All of us do.
I believe that true.
It's not a partisan issue from the members who are on HASC,
but I just promise you,
if Mattis and Kelly ask for a continuing resolution,
you're gonna have a continuing resolution
and until you hold Congress' feet to the fire,
you're gonna have to watch our capabilities further degrade
and so I would just ask for your help in speaking with them
and making sure that they say
no more continuing resolutions.
If Congress has to cancel going home for Christmas,
then Congress can cancel going home for Christmas
just like the soldiers do.
But again, I respect both of you, all three of you,
and thank you for your service
and I just hope that we can put an end to this madness
by December 31st, but it's up to you.
It's up to y'all.
Mattis can do it, Kelly can do it,
they've got enough credibility up here.
So,
Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany,
we talked yesterday about the shortfalls in helicopters,
we're talking today about
the shortfalls in amphibious ships.
General,
you've got two Marine Corps Logistics Centers.
The one in Albany is not technically in my district,
but I have family that works there,
although we don't claim each other for fear of termination.
(chuckling)
The maintenance on the amphibious assault vehicles,
who does that?
Is that in Albany or is that in the west coast depot?
- Maybe both, but I'm definitely certain
it's happening in Albany.
- [Scott] Okay.
- And we greatly appreciate the work
that's being done there,
to include the recovery of the tornado effects
in January of '17 and what's been able to be accomplished
by that workforce is nothing short of amazing.
To include the reset of our equipment
from Afghanistan were 94%.
We had, I believe, almost 87,000 items
that were rolled back from combat that needed to be reworked
and we are closing in on the completion
of resetting that equipment back in Albany.
So tremendous effort by your family members
and others in Albany.
We greatly appreciate the support of Congress on that.
- I was there shortly after that storm
and we were very fortunate that that tornado
was a little bit further to the south,
then we would have lost some lives on that base.
They did a tremendous job of cleaning up
and getting things back in order.
What systemic challenges do you have
at the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany
and what changes can we make to help you
with any of those challenges?
- Sir, I'd better defer that,
I can take that for the record if you might
and I'll bring that back to our
Director for Installations and Logistics.
That was squarely within his portfolio
and I can give you a more accurate answer, sir.
- Perfect, thank you.
And I look forward to seeing you
December 23rd up here doing our job
and I hope that Mattis and Kelly
will help get us out of this mess by the end of the year.
Thank you.
- Thank you very much, Congressman Scott.
We now proceed to Congressman Joe Courtney of Connecticut.
- Thank you Mr. Chairman
and thank you to the witnesses for being her.
I would note, as Mr. Scott said,
the NDA is now on its way over to the White House,
which passed with the strongest bipartisan vote since 2008.
And part of that bill included the sea power mark,
which increased the size of the amphibious fleet
by one boat above what the President sent over.
So there is some signs of intelligent life on the Hill here.
But obviously, even at that pace,
in terms of hitting the requirement of 38 ships,
it's still gonna take a while
and obviously in the mean time,
you have to figure out the most
creative ways possible to boost training.
And General, a number of us were
over in Australia last summer on a codel
and they were describing the joint amphibious training
exercise that the Marines did from Darwin in 2016.
I mean, is that maybe another sort of avenue,
in terms of, again, working with allies,
in terms of doing joint training exercises
to, again, sharpen people's skills?
- Sir, it is.
I think you might be referring to Tandem Thrust
that occurs on a recurring basis down in Australia.
So yes, very much so.
Not just in Australia, to get aboard their partnerships,
but to get aboard ships from the UK,
from Spain, France, the Dutch.
So what we refer to as an allied maritime basing initiative,
particularly in Europe, it's not uncommon to find
US Marines aboard our allied partner ships.
So in addition to that, our use of alternative platforms,
the ESDs and the expeditionary support bases
like the USS Puller and soon the USS Keith,
provides that additional capability for us
to get aboard a ship and still exercise
our aviation elements and our command and control.
So we're trying to be as creative as we can
with not just our amphib ships,
but alternative platforms as well as allied ships.
- Thank you.
Mr. Russell, again, your report kind of listed,
again, sort of more creative ways to increase jointness.
And if you had to prioritize, of the recommendations,
which one is really the one that you think stands out
as probably the most effective in the short-term?
- Well, I'd say it's a close call between two of them,
but certainly the idea of trying to more
systematically evaluate the training priorities
and establish or look at the alternatives
to the amphibious ships, whether it's
maritime prepositioning fleet ships or allied ships.
But coming up with a strategic, thoughtful way
to look and balance those resources
amongst priorities and alternatives
is probably one of the top recommendations
in order to manage those resources
that are available to the best we can.
And then it goes back also to the second recommendation
that we made on naval integration
and that is strategically thinking about
how you tie together both the Navy and the Marine Corps
so that they're looking together
at some of the joint aspects of it,
in terms of leveraging availabilities
and creating those compatible systems
and policies and procedures where the two are
working together and in a more cohesive way.
- Thank you, I yield back.
- Thank you very much, Congressman Courtney.
We now proceed to Congresswoman Vicky Hartzler of Missouri.
- Good morning, gentlemen.
In your report, your testimony, General,
you talk about how in 1990 the Navy possessed
62 amphibious ships and we have 32 today
and then how there was this mutually agreed
38 ship requirement.
You also mentioned that Admiral Greenert in April of 2014
said that we need about 50 amphibious gray hulls.
So can you give me just a little background
on how you settled for 38?
And how many do you really think you need?
- Thank you, ma'am, for that question.
The number 38 is really centered on
a look that occurred in 2009 between
the Commandant of the Marine Corps
and the Chief of Naval Operations.
It's kind of held true since for the past eight years
and that's our requirement to be able
to have a forcible entry capability
with two Marine expeditionary brigades.
And so if you look at the number of 38,
and then it was determined at 34,
was based on the perceived funding levels for the future
was about 34 ships is what would be
fiscally affordable at that time,
of which minus 10% in maintenance would leave you about 30
operationally available to support the lift
of two Marine expeditionary brigades.
So that's essentially how we got to the 38.
We will get there in FY '33.
So the risk is between now and fiscal year 2033
on getting to that objective level.
And that's also the additional assumption
that was made on 10% of that fleet being in maintenance.
Well, we know that history indicates
that we are at a higher percentage than 90%.
Less availability, in other words,
than what we're finding in the yards.
And, for instance today,
14 of 32 ships are undergoing maintenance.
- Well, this is very concerning.
I just returned from South Korea and Japan and Guam
with Chairman Wilson and Madeleine Bordallo and others
and saw where our Marines in the past
have had to come on the shore at Okinawa and at Guam.
And as we look at what's going on in South Korea,
we need to have this capability.
Your testimony also refers to the concerns with
the capacity gaps with mine countermeasures,
naval surface fire support.
You say we need a modern and capable countermine capability
to facilitate access and the shortfalls.
So that's very concerning as well.
Can you tell me more about what
you're doing to address these concerns?
- I can and then I'd maybe have
Admiral Lewis add any additional,
particularly on the mine countermeasures piece.
It's a topic that was brought before the Naval Board,
in other words, between the Commandant
and the Chief of Naval Operations
just a couple of months ago
on getting a comprehensive review from the N95,
which is expeditionary warfare there within the OPNAV staff
on looking at the challenges we have
and what are the proposed solutions.
We know that we don't have sufficient capacity in that area,
but we're looking at things that are,
you know, unmanned capability
and other technological improvements in that area.
Naval surface fire support, we've addressed the kind of
experimentation you've seen, again, in Dawn Blitz
of trying to look at extending the range of naval gun,
which is about 13 miles today,
to look at what kind of Marine Corps systems
can we put afloat that will get us ranges out to 43 miles.
Or perhaps in the future, out to a couple hundred miles.
And do we take an amphibious ship like an LPD-17 class,
they may be available to put
vertical launch system configuration on that ship
and bring a rocket system aboard that isn't there today
at some relative cost.
It may not be that great with
the existing systems we have today
incorporated for shipboard use
that will get us those ranges out to 200
and, perhaps tracking what the Army's
developing for long-range precision fires,
maybe ranges out to 400-plus miles in the future.
So these are things we're all looking at
in terms of filling that gap on naval surface fire support
and technological measures on the mine countermeasures.
- Let me just ask one more question.
The GAO report talked about the virtual training option,
but it also...
Anyway, what is the status of your efforts
to address GAO's recommendation to develop guidance
for the development and use of virtual training devices
and what extent are Marine Corps virtual training devices
able to integrate with Navy devices
for the purposes of simulating amphibious operations?
- Within our Training and Education Command,
they have really the portfolio for training in general
and that would reside with Lieutenant General Walsh
and I know they're looking hard at this.
There is a Marine Corps
simulated training environment concept.
I think the GAO report is spot-on in their assessment
on the analysis upfront and the evaluation on the backend,
but there are some things that we are doing today
through simulation under definite enhancements
that allow for our live opportunities to be more effective,
because we've been able to rehearse some of that.
Primarily command elements,
which if you look at the comprehensive array
of what's out there in the virtual training world,
everything from a simulation system for a pilot to rehearse
landings on a rolling ship at night in rough seas
to the command and control capabilities
we have at a place like Marine Corps
Training and Operations Group at 29 Palms.
If we look at the ability of our MAGTF simulation systems
on rehearsing a staff's ability to plan
in an integrated fashion with the Navy
prior to going to sea, we do that routinely with the MUEs.
It's called R2P2, Rapid Response Planning Process.
So they do use some simulation and virtual training
to go through their preliminary stages.
In terms of systems that are designed
really for amphibious capabilities, outside of...
You know, what I've referred to in our,
I'll rewind the tape a little bit there and say
we also have some systems that are
applicable to operations ashore.
When Marines finally hit the beach,
we have a squad immersive trainer on both coasts
that can be reconfigured to replicate
really any kind of environment.
It's really kind of at the squad level.
So there are things that are applicable
that we're doing today ashore that would have
certain applicability in amphibious operations.
But amphib-specific kind of simulators,
there aren't a lot that we have today
and perhaps none in the Navy that would get us
to where we would want to be in the future.
So it's a system of systems that you can piece together
to project what you need to do
once the landing force is ashore.
- Okay, thank you, thank you.
- Thank you, Congresswoman Hartzer.
We now proceed to Congressman Trent Kelly of Mississippi.
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Leave it to a redneck to break something.
You know, I want to concur in what Austin Scott said.
It is critical that we not hear
mixed messages from the military community,
whether that be at lower level
or from our generals or admirals.
CRs kill our readiness.
I know that.
I currently serve in our Guard
and I can tell you it kills our readiness
and you will never hear me say anything other than that.
It's not okay for a CR.
Not a short one, not a long one, not anyone.
It is killing our readiness.
So I just hope that that message will be heard.
The second part is we've gotten so focused on
the coin fight for the last 16 years.
I see my soldiers, I see young majors,
or sometimes a little older majors,
I see E-6s and E-7s who don't know how to fight
the real fight that we're here for
and at the end of the day,
the Marine Corps is not here to do a coin fight.
They're real good at that,
they're real good at a lot of things,
but you guys are here to make forced landing
on a contested beachhead to get us a foothold,
to go to war with our enemies,
to be able to project power from there.
It's critical that we have the elements to do those things,
we have the training to do those things,
and that we focus on those tasks that are critical to us.
I mean, that's why we have a Marine Corps.
And so I guess, going back, naval surface fires,
you know, we don't have battleships anymore,
we do not have the ability to have
naval surface fire support like we had in the past.
Tomahawks and Cubs are great,
but they don't do the same things
as those big guns on those battleships used to do.
And if you're making a forced landing,
I assure you you don't want to go
where just Tomahawks and Cubs have been,
because you still got a lot of fighting to do
to get through that.
How would your rate, General Beaudreault,
how would you rate the naval surface fires readiness
and what are we doing to improve it?
- I'll defer to Admiral Lewis on any improvements
to the naval surface fire support platforms.
My understanding of that which is afloat is fine.
What we are, just as you referred to Congressman,
is a loot with range limitation.
The ships' survivability in a contested environment
to close within the ranges that would be required
to even get support for a five inch gun, for instance,
is something we're gonna have to rethink.
So the coin of the realm in the future
is long-range precision fires
and more ships protection against
missile threats and an air threat.
Which, looking at our potential adversaries
and our competitors out there, what they're building,
stealth capability and likewise,
is something that we,
this technological edge we used to have,
is something we're very aware of,
something we're very concerned about,
and something we need to counter.
So survivability of the amphibious platforms
to get in close is a big concern.
We need to make them more lethal,
we need to make them more survivable.
And the lethality goes to
the naval surface fire support piece
and the survivability gets to the missile defense piece.
- Admiral, if you can talk about that please.
- Yes, sir.
The contested environment that you referred to,
years ago was in close to the beachhead.
It's now everywhere.
If you look throughout the maritime,
all straits, the Strait of Hormuz,
Malacca Straits, wherever,
and further out into the maritime.
So it's all a battle space now.
A priority, a very high priority for the Navy
is development of long-range precision
surface to surface fires.
That is very much, and it's not just in this fight,
it's in what we would call, you know,
traditionally a blue water fight,
which is very, been very much of,
you know, it's been very blurred
in that regard from the contested space.
Where we are right now in surface fires
is just over 10 nautical miles and that's not far enough.
Part of that, though, is the systems,
the command and control systems,
and the ability to network our capabilities
from Navy ships at sea, well out to sea,
to in close to onshore.
That networking is something that we're very focused on
with Navy-Marine Corps first and with the Air Force
and with the Army as we go forward.
But that is something that, it's a real need,
we're not closely achieving it.
First, we've got to get to the building blocks first,
which is the basic units
and the capability of the ARG and MUE.
- I thank both of you for your answer.
I think that's something we need to
really focus on and focus on quick.
The bottom line, there's a lot of difference
going into a beachhead or a hardened target
that has been saturated with heavy fires
than to go in somewhere that has kind of been
just kind of hit a little bit.
There's a lot of fighting left and we don't want to
lose Marines when we can do that with firepower.
And with that, my time's expired.
- Thank you very much Colonel Congressman Kelly.
We now proceed to Congressman Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin.
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I (clears throat) excuse me.
I would just like to, I don't have a cool Southern accent,
but I would like to associate myself
with the remarks of Mr. Kelly and Mr. Scott.
I really think that now is the critical time to get out
from under this problem from a budgetary prospective.
I don't think we can afford another CR,
so I think we have to make a stand over the next month.
And I know it might seem absurd from your perspective
for us to put the onus on you,
given that we are a separate branch of government
which provides you with funding and it's our job,
but we really need your help,
'cause you guys bring a credibility that Congress does not.
Congress is rocking a 12% approval rating right now,
I think you guys have a 90% approval rating.
So we're gonna need your partnership over the next month.
By the way, that approval rating is
lower than cockroaches and colonoscopies
to give you a sense of how bad the problem is right now.
Because, and I hate to be critical,
since I've only been here a year,
but when it comes to this issue,
which should be the most important issue for all of us,
it just perplexes me as to why a year into this Congress
we are still in this situation
when we know how much damage the BCA
and sequester has done to our military
and how much damage another continuing resolution would do,
as the Secretary laid out in the letter
to Chairman McCain and some others a month ago.
So I would just second the sentiments
of Colonel Kelly and Austin Scott.
This next month I view to be as absolutely critical
and I'm not gonna support any effort
that continues to punt this problem
down the road any further.
It's just, I can't look my buddies
who are still on active duty in the eye,
given that I'm unexpectedly in this role, and do that.
So if we have to cancel Christmas, that's fine with me.
I'm happy to stay here and they should
lock us on the House floor until we get this done.
So thank you for being here
and shedding light on these issues.
And I would just ask a sort of followup
of what Congresswoman Hartzler suggested.
So we know we've gone from 61 amphibs down to 32
and the requirement is 38?
Is that correct, I have that right?
So can you just give me a sense,
and forgive if I missed this,
how that impacts our op plans, particularly in the Pacific,
and whether that should require us to rethink these op plans
or rethink whether they're even realistic to begin with.
- Congressman, just on the evaluation of our ability
to execute any of the op plans,
if you permit, I will take that question,
'cause I think it would, I don't want to breech
or wander into any of the classified territory,
so I think I can provide you the best,
most comprehensive answer in that classified form.
- [Gallagher] Sure.
- I echo that,
but what I would mirror at the unclassified level,
if there is a conflict in the Pacific
that we're faced with right now,
in the scenario we're faced with right now,
it's not gonna be like what we've been
faced with over the last 15 years.
And that is a large-scale conflict
with considerable risk to a lot of American lives.
And that is why, in our capacity in amphibious ships
and Marines, and Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, Coast Guardsmen,
is not where it needs to be.
We're gonna go to the fight and we're gonna win.
- [Gallagher] Yeah.
- But that's a real serious thing right now
and the fact of passing a budget
and not having continuing resolution
would get us one step closer to being prepared.
But passing a continuing resolution would,
as I said in my opening remarks
and you all have mirrored much better than I have,
it's just stemmed the readiness issues,
it hasn't reversed them.
And we're in a real need of
reversing those readiness issues.
- [Gallagher] Yeah.
- And that was the only thing I would say on top of that.
- Well, usually I criticize people
that use their five minutes to give speeches
and not ask questions, but I'm violating that today.
I just want to go back to this point.
You know, this is the centennial
of our entry into World War I
and so I've been doing kind of
a nerdy deep dive into Wisconsin's history
and we led the opposition to the war.
Bob La Follette, our most famous politician,
was the leader of the progressive Republicans
and, you know, fought on the Senate chamber
to delay arming merchant vessels and all this,
but not withstanding that crazy debate that we had
that really divided the country,
we had a lot of German-Americans in Wisconsin,
we managed to come together afterwards
and do the right thing for the country.
And the entire country mobilized in support of our troops.
That's not to say it wasn't without problems
and we experienced a lot of interesting
and divisive issues on the home front,
but I just feel like this is the time
where we got to come together.
And I think we can, I think we can.
Working with you guys, we can do it.
Now's the decisive moment.
And I believe what we do over the next month
can really put us on the right path
for the next decade, if not longer.
So thank you guys for being here
and taking the time to shed some light
on these critical issues.
- Congressman, I'd like to follow up
for just one quick note on that.
And that probably the greatest degradation we've faced
under the CRs is our inability to do the new starts.
And we talk about building ships,
if we can't have new starts,
our adversaries or potential adversaries
are cranking out new ships once every six weeks.
So we find, again, our maritime superiority edge narrowing
through the continuing resolution
that is not allowing us to stay on
a glide path for readiness recovery
and maintain a superiority on the sea,
to be honest with you.
- My time's expired, but I yield.
- Thank you very much, Congressman Gallagher.
And as we conclude, it's obvious to you
that we really are facing
the continuing resolution right now, you are too,
and I appreciate Congressman Scott
so eloquently presenting it
and backed up of course by Congressman Kelly,
and Congressman Gallagher, and Congresswoman Hartzler.
And then this may be lightning's gonna strike,
bipartisan with Congresswoman Bordallo and Courtney,
but it really would be helpful to us to have very brief,
as I indicated yesterday and I'll just restate,
to have examples of increased cost,
the delays that it caused.
And then you've actually brought up new items
that need to be in this very brief one page letter
and that would be the new starts.
And there could be a paragraph
as to the capabilities of adversaries
that have a six week capability.
That is just incredible.
But we need to have facts
and actually Congressman Gallagher was extremely correct,
I was gonna point out that we need facts
that would be merit based, but actually you have credibility
and that would help us as we explain to our colleagues
the phenomenal challenges to our country
and the risk to our country.
And then we could also, once we take some hard votes,
we're gonna have to go home
and explain this to our constituents
and it can best be done if we are presenting
specific facts that you can provide.
Again, we want to thank you for your service,
it's just inspiring to be with
such extraordinary individuals,
and we appreciate your service, each of you.
And Congresswoman Bordallo, of course, we need to represent,
we need to present the wonderful territory of Guam.
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to go on record to say
that I certainly support eliminating the CR.
- And again, just bipartisan,
and to address the issue of sequestration, we keep punting,
but we want to back you up for the defense of our country.
And with this, we shall be adjourned.
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